FALLACY DALAM ARGUMENTASI HUKUM HAKIM: ANALISIS NORMATIF PUTUSAN PENINJAUAN KEMBALI NOMOR 1362 PK/Pdt/2024
Keywords:
legal reasoning; judicial argumentation; fallacy; impartiality; court decisionAbstract
Judicial decisions require more than formal conformity with legal rules; they must also demonstrate a rational connection between facts, legal norms, and conclusions. This article examines the potential logical weaknesses in judicial reasoning in Supreme Court review decision No. 1362 PK/Pdt/2024, particularly in relation to objections concerning the composition of the panel and the principles of judicial independence and impartiality. The study uses normative legal research with statutory, case, and conceptual approaches. Primary legal materials include Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power and the decision under study, while secondary materials include legal scholarship on legal reasoning, fallacies, and argumentation theory. The analysis uses the structure of legal syllogism and Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentation, supported by the ideas of Robert Alexy and Chaïm Perelman. The findings indicate that the reasoning can be assessed through the adequacy of its data, warrant, supporting grounds, and response to counterarguments. In particular, a conclusion that an objection is insufficient must be supported by a clear explanation of why the relevant facts do not meet the legal threshold and why plausible counterarguments should be rejected. The article does not equate every brief or contested judicial explanation with a fallacy; rather, it identifies potential argumentative vulnerabilities that require close textual verification against the full judgment. It recommends a structured reasoning model that explicitly connects facts, norms, inference, and rebuttal to strengthen legal certainty, fairness, and public confidence in the judiciary.







